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FRANKLIN G. SNYDER*
Students in contracts and commercial law courses are routinely taught that
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is a product of the Legal Realist
movement-that it was designed by its principal draftsman, Karl Llewellyn,
to more accurately reflect the needs and realities of modern business than
the prior common law and statutes it displaced That story is important,
because it is routinely retold as we explain to students the provisions in
Article 2 that change the powers, rights, and responsibilities of contracting
parties. Yet that story is a myth. There is relatively little "Realism'" in
Article 2, whether we are speaking descriptively or normatively. Moreover,
the rhetoric of Realism actually serves to camouflage the deliberate
regulatory and social policy decisions that were made by the drafters and
the legislators.
This Article, part of a symposium on "Commercial Calamities "focuses on
four of the major innovations in contract doctrine introduced by Article 2:
the new contract formation rules, the merchant duty of good faith, the
relaxation of the certainty requirement, and the greater reliance on trade
usage evidence. Upon examination, it turns out that none has any
discernable Realist roots. None of them reflects either the needs or desires
of actual merchants and the lawyers who represent them. Rather, they are
the result of a deliberate but largely unexpressed desire to move away from
libertarian ideas of laissez-faire contracting to a regulated communal
system purged of hard bargaining and sharp deals. More regulation of
contracting in the interest of restraining hard bargaining may be a laudable
goal, but it has nothing to do with Legal Realism. This Article argues that
the "calamitous" result of this Realist rhetoric is to shift the focus away
from the actual policy choices made in the statute to a world of mythical
"bargains in fact" where we can pretend that we are simply carrying out
the wishes of the parties. Stripping away the rhetoric is the first step in
allowing us to take a clean look at what the drafters wrought and to make
our own social and political decisions.
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. This paper was
prepared for the "Commercial Calamities" symposium at the January 2006 annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Commercial Law. It
benefited from the helpful comments of participants at a faculty colloquium at Notre
Dame Law School in January 2006, in particular those of Jay Tidmarsh. Thanks to Jeff
Lipshaw, Julian Velasco, Larry Garvin, and Ann Mirabito for reviewing earlier drafts.
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"How shall we dispel those clouds of mystery with which
politics have covered this strange transaction?"'
"Of all of these things, only 'see it fresh,' 'see it clean' and 'come back
to make sure' are of the essence." 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Every great human creation carries with it a mythology. Myths are
traditional stories, accepted as history, that serve to explain the origins,
history, deities, heroes, and world-view of a people or institution. Myths are
not necessarily untrue, and even when they are, they may contain a good deal
of truth.3 Good myths, true or not, clarify and explain. They help us to
understand the world at a deeper level than mere facts. But some myths are
not good. Bad myths are those that are not merely untrue, but actually
obscure our understanding and cloud our judgment.
The Uniform Commercial Code4 has its own mythology. Like many
creation myths, it parallels that of classical antiquity, with the revolt of Jove
and his brothers Neptune and Pluto against the rule of the monstrous Saturn
(who devoured his children) and the other elemental Titans, breaking their
power and establishing a new order on Mount Olympus. In this tale, Jove-
here played by Columbia law professor Karl Llewellyn-leads a small band
of brethren who call themselves Legal Realists (among them Arthur Corbin,
Soia Mentschikoff, and Grant Gilmore) against the life-devouring rule of the
Titans of Legal Formalism (Christopher Columbus Langdell and Samuel
Williston) to create a new Mount Olympus, the Code.
Basic to this tale are the claims that the Code is a product of Legal
Realism, that it was a reaction against inadequacies that business had found
under the prior common law and the old Uniform Sales Act (Williston's pre-
Llewellyn codification of sales law), and that its provisions were derived
1 2 IsAAc D'ISRAELI, CURIOSmES OF LITERATURE 4 (B. D'Israeli ed., 1868).
2 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 510
(1960).
3 For example, Abraham Lincoln probably did once walk four miles to give a
customer back some change, and George Washington probably did not chop down a
cherry tree, but both stories accurately reflect the basic honesty of both men.
4 All references and citations to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(hereinafter U.C.C., or the Code) are to the pre-2003 version. The extensive revisions in
the 2003 Revised Article 2 have not, as of this writing, been adopted by any state and
seem unlikely to be adopted in the future. In any event, the changes made in the Revised
Article 2 (such as those to U.C.C. section 2-207) would not affect the discussion here.
For convenience, I will sometimes refer to "the Code," but my discussion will be focused
chiefly on Article 2 and those provisions of Article 1 that apply to sales transactions.
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from the study of actual business practices and designed to bring the law into
line with modem commercial practices. One of the leading figures in modem
commercial law recently referred to the Code as "the ultimate Realist
statute," 5 while others have called it a "great monument" to Realism. 6 Karl
Llewellyn declared that it was intended to be a "helpful device" to "men of
commerce," 7 and that it was "to be for consumption by commercial men, as
well as lawyers."8 This Realist myth is understandable since Llewellyn was
himself a Legal Realist, perhaps the preeminent one. 9 Llewellyn was also the
father of the Uniform Commercial Code and the principal draftsman of
Article 2, which governs sales of goods.
But there is, in fact, surprisingly little Realism in Article 2. Llewellyn
was a Realist, but he was also, in N.E.H. Hull's perfect phrase, a bricoleur, a
man who takes bits and pieces of whatever he finds ready at hand to cobble
together the structure he desires.' 0 Dennis Patterson says that Llewellyn's
"ultimate achievement in the Code [is] the articulation of a social vision of
the proper relationship between doctrine and theory.' 11 Yet a look at what
Llewellyn actually wrought suggests that, for him, the proper relationship
between theory and doctrine is to use whichever one gives him the result he
wants in a given situation. Llewellyn would rely on the practices of
merchants and business lawyers when it suited him. When it did not-when
the merchants were not doing things the way he thought they should have
been done-he ignored them. As he explained: "I believe in controlling the
practices of the market-place where the practices of the market-place need
control. That is my personal opinion. I believe in conforming to the practices
of the market-place where they are sound to conform to. The law is not to
abdicate to business."'12
5 Richard Speidel, Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools Mid-Year
Meeting (June 16, 2005).
6 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 305 (1994).
7 Karl Llewellyn, The Reasons for a Uniform Commercial Code, in WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 525 (1973).
8 1d.
9 Llewellyn is generally credited with inventing the term in a pair of law review
articles. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 449 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931).
10 See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11-12 (1997).
11 Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L.
REv. 169, 175 (1989).
12 Allen Kamp, Stories of the Code, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN. L. REV. 377, 379-80 n.17
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Llewellyn's vision, as others have noted, was rooted as much in
filmmaker Frank Capra as in Legal Realism. He wanted "small-town
cooperation and social normalcy," and to favor the "little man" over the "big
man."' 13 He believed that government control of industry during World War
II proved that managed production was less "blind and wasteful" than the
previous laissez-faire regime. 14 In short, he wanted to replace (though the
word he used was "adjust") the rough-and-tumble hard bargaining of
classical capitalism with a "balanced" statute that would specify the rights
and obligations of the parties. 15 What business people actually wanted was
largely irrelevant. 16
Llewellyn had an objective in drafting Article 2. He was not fixing an
"outdated" legal system, though some parts of the Sales Act (like some parts
of Article 2 today) were probably antiquated. Rather, he objected to the
social and political premises on which that system was based and wanted to
wipe them away. He wanted to replace the largely laissez-faire rules of
classical contract law with a New Deal regulatory scheme, to "carry on the
program of the National Recovery Act after it was declared unconstitutional"
by establishing a mechanism for enforcing "fair commercial practices.' 7 He
was trying to impose "his own normative vision" 18 of a marketplace purged
of the sordid, unregulated competition of the actual business world of his
day, and policed by merchant groups and the state. 19 One of the Code's
(2005) (quoting Llewellyn from a conversation at the annual conference of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1940).
13 See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 173
(1987).
14 Kamp, supra note 12, at 380.
'
5 1d. at 380-81.
16 Llewellyn once compared the prior law of sales to a restored New England
farmhouse. No matter how much you updated it, it would never have enough closets and
the kitchen would still be in the wrong place. See Karl Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying
Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687, 688 (1948), quoted in Kamp, supra note
12, at 378. He presumably preferred the "modem" architecture of the 1940s. It is an open
question whether those 1946 Bauhaus boxes-many being knocked down for parking lots
today-will ever match the popular appeal of the old New England farmhouse for
comfort and livability.
17 Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code
1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 359, 425 (2001).
18 Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 472 (1987).
19 Llewellyn's original version of the Code even provided for juries of merchants to
try commercial cases. Had that measure survived the drafting process, it would have been
a powerful tool for enforcing cartel rules and restricting competition over such things as
"unfair" prices or bargains.
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drafters, Grant Gilmore-who (perhaps not coincidentally) had almost no
experience in commercial law before Llewellyn recruited him for the
project-noted in 1949 that a major goal of the effort was to move from
laissez-faire contracting to a more regulated system.20 It is not surprising that
Gilmore would later become a leading proponent of the movement to absorb
contract law into tort law.21 Tort law, with its duties defined solely by social
regulatory norms, is the antithesis of laissez-faire contracting.
All of this is widely known, but it is not the story most students are
taught in commercial law courses. And that is a problem. For not only is the
Realist myth untrue, it clouds much of our thinking about Article 2. There are
deliberate regulatory choices in Article 2-a reallocation of power both
among contracting parties and between contracting parties and the state-that
masquerade as Realist insights about how "real" business people do things.
There are many situations in which we might decide that an unwilling party
should be forced to give a warranty, accept a defective shipment, or submit to
arbitration, even when it has strongly objected to such terms. But we will not
get very far with our analysis if we pretend that our forcible allocation of
liability is merely carrying out what the parties themselves really intended all
along as their "bargain in fact." 22
The drafters of the Code made specific normative policy choices about
when liability should be imposed despite a lack of consent by one party, and
when a party should be released from a bargain to which it did consent. If we
are to evaluate those choices-and maybe make our own-we need to strip
away the rhetoric that obscures them. We need to stop the pretense that we
are carrying out some bargain of the parties and justify these provisions on
regulatory terms, where they can be debated in the open. Some regulations
may be justifiable and some not. And when we move our focus from a
mythical "bargain in fact" to "should liability be imposed for this or that
act?" we may find other areas that could be much better regulated than they
are under the Code.
My purpose here is not to quarrel with any particular bit of the Code, but
rather to shift the focus from the Realist rhetoric to the nuts and bolts of what
is happening and why. To do that, I will take a Realist look at some
provisions of Article 2, focusing particularly on those sections that were
considered to be innovations at the time of its adoption. Part II provides some
necessary background, briefly outlining the state of affairs against which the
Realists were rebelling: 19th century Legal Formalism. Part III gives an
equally brief sketch of Legal Realism and outlines what, in general, it means
20 Kamp, supra note 17, at 427.
21 See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-112 (Ronald K.L.
Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
22 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2004).
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to be a "Realist" statute, at least as that term is regularly used in commercial
law circles. Part IV turns to four specific areas of Article 2 jurisprudence and
examines whether they fit any of the criteria that might allow them to be
labeled as "Realist" in any meaningful sense. Part V draws the various
threads together and show that today's Article 2 looks much more like a
(frequently botched and inadequate) New Deal regulatory scheme than like a
Realist statute attempting to accommodate the law to the needs of business
people.
II. LEGAL FORMALISM
In Realist debates about contract law, the term "Formalist" usually refers
to one of two things. First, it means the "legal science," championed most
notably by Dean C.C. Langdell of Harvard, in which results in concrete
contractual disputes can ostensibly be derived from a set of prior principles. 23
Second, it often includes the free-wheeling constitutional interpretation
engaged in by the turn-of-the-century U.S. Supreme Court in cases like
Lochner v. New York,24 which enshrined freedom of contract as a
constitutional right.
These were, in fact, two very different phenomena. Langdell believed
that one could derive correct answers to concrete cases based on a series of
neutral principles that would lead to predictable results, while the Supreme
Court was engaged in wholesale political revisionism. It was possible to be a
Langdellian legal scientist while not accepting the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence, and vice versa. The only real connection
between them was the fact that both were consistent with a laissez-faire
political view of the role of government, a view that dominated the
nineteenth century but largely passed away in the twentieth.
There is also a third sense in which Formalism is used. This
Formalism-which is, I believe, what most modern Formalists mean when
they talk about it25-is not tied up with either Langdell's legal science or
with the constitutional protection of laissez-faire economics. This Formalism
is, at bottom, the idea that rules of law should be fixed, clear, and knowable
in advance--or as fixed, clear, and knowable as possible-and that they
should apply even where a judge in a particular case may think that the
application is unjust. A rule that sets a speed limit at forty-five miles per hour
23 One of the best expositions of Langdell's own version of legal science is still
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
24 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25 See Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and
Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIuM 121 (2006) (discussing the theoretical differences
between classical and contemporary Formalists).
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on a particular road, for example, is Formalist. Its application is entirely
mechanical. This is so even though it cannot be deduced from the higher
principles of Langdellian science, and even though it is certainly not a
laissez-faire rule. The rule may be over- or underinclusive. On this particular
road there may be some stretches where a reasonable person might safely
drive fifty-five miles per hour, and others where she might need to drive only
forty miles per hour. But the driver can, at least in theory, control whether
she is in violation. A rule that requires drivers to drive "at a reasonable speed
under all the circumstances" is not Formalist in this sense, because a driver
cannot with certainty predict the outcome of driving at any given speed.
In contract law, some Formalist rules, like the perfect tender rule,26 are
Langdellian. We can derive the seller's obligation to render perfect
performance under a contract of sale from the propositions that a contract is a
voluntary undertaking and that the buyer's performance is contingent on the
seller's performance. Making the buyer take anything other than what it had
specifically agreed to take would violate those principles. On the other hand,
there are rules routinely regarded as Formalist that cannot be deduced from
general principles, such as the writing requirements of the statute of frauds,27
the parol evidence rule, 28 and the statute of limitations.29
Much of the anti-Formalist rhetoric of the Realists is actually focused on
Langdellian legal science, not necessarily on the desirability of fixed and
knowable rules. A good deal of that rhetoric is overblown. 30 William
LaPiana31 and Mark Movsesian 32 have shown, for Langdell and Williston
respectively, that their jurisprudence bears relatively little resemblance to the
later Realist caricatures. Langdell, who had much more actual law practice
experience than most of the Realists, virtually invented contract law as a
subject for study. He was the first to make university law students do what
practicing lawyers do: read actual cases and try to figure them out, instead of
sitting in a hall listening to windy lectures on theory. As for Williston, we
only need to note how much of his Sales Act is actually in Article 233 and
26 See U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002).
2 7 See id. § 2-201.
28 See id. § 2-202.
29 See id. § 2-725.
30 Part of the reason for the stridency of the rhetoric may be that the Realists were
clustered at Yale and Columbia, while Langdell and Williston were Harvard men.
31 See WILLIAM P. LAPiANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994).
32 Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 207
(2005).
33 See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
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how valuable his treatise has been to generations of practicing lawyers34 to
realize that he was by no means an abstract theoretician counting angels
dancing on the head of a pin.
Formalists, contrary to some of the calumnies they have endured, are not
opposed to changes in the law. The Restatements of Law produced by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in the 1920s and 1930s are often regarded as
the "high water mark" of formalism, 35 but they were not undertaken out of
love for abstract doctrine. The ALI was founded as a bastion of the elite
practicing bar,36 a group much less interested in abstract legal theory than
even the most Realistic law professor. For example, the actual charge the
ALI gave to Samuel Williston and the other Restatement drafters was:
not only be to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to simplify
unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which will
tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life. The character of the
restatement which we have in mind can be best described by saying that it
should be at once analytical, critical and constructive. 37
The goal was obviously more certainty-something practicing lawyers
and clients nearly always want-not more theoretical consistency. The
goal of better adapting the law to "the needs of life" could have been
taken verbatim from the Realist playbook, if Realism had yet existed
when the ALI started its work.
A problem with Formalist rules in general, and in the commercial context
in particular, is that they sometimes lead to apparent miscarriages of justice.
Fixed rules, as noted above, are usually either over- or underinclusive. This
means that a system of formal commercial law will lead, in some number of
cases, to false positives (finding an obligation where the parties did not
intend one) and false negatives (failing to find an obligation where the parties
did intend one).38 A Formal rule can never be as accurate as one that allows
34 It is still in print, though under new authorship. See RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1990).
35 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1995).
3 6 See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE
NEW DEAL 142 (1995).
37 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, 1
A.L.I. PROC. 14 (1923), quoted in DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 24. Duxbury reads the first
portions of these goals-clearing up uncertainty and getting rid of unnecessary
complexities-as showing that the ALI had gone over to Langdellian science. But laws
can be made clear and simple in any number of ways, and the ALI leaders-like nearly
all experienced practitioners-presumably wanted practical certainty and simplicity, not
the theoretical sort.
38 Take, for example, the "four comers rule" of contract law, where the court looks
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for complete fact-finding and full discretion by the decision-maker,39 at least
if the decision-maker has perfect knowledge, infinite resources, and
Solomonic wisdom. Formalism has relative advantages where knowledge is
imperfect, resources are limited, and judges are fallible. We will get more
wrong answers, perhaps, but we will spend a lot less time and money getting
them.
III. LEGAL REALISM
It is impossible to give anything approaching a good account of Legal
Realism here. It is probably impossible to give a full account of it anywhere,
given that there is likely little about law that someone called a "Realist" has
not said somewhere.40 Morton Horwitz, in writing extensively and
sympathetically about the Realists, concluded: "Legal realism was neither a
coherent intellectual movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence.
It expressed more an intellectual mood than a clear body of tenets, more a set
of sometimes contradictory tendencies than a rigorous set of methodologies
or propositions about legal theory."'41 Many scholars have tried to nail down
exactly what Realism is. They disagree.
For present purposes we do not need to resolve that question. I am going
to focus here on what we might call "Pop Realism" or the "lore of Realism."
That is, I will use the version of Realism that seems to be routinely taught in
American contracts and commercial law courses when law professors talk
about the origins and purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code. This Pop
Realism has both a descriptive and a normative component, and both are
rooted in Llewellyn's ideas.
Before going on, I should clarify some things that I am not talking about
when I talk about Realism. First, Realism here is not simple rule skepticism.
Despite some loose rhetoric here and there, neither Llewellyn nor the other
drafters who worked on Article 2 were rule skeptics. They would hardly have
spent twenty-five years trying to impose a complex body of rules on the
world if they thought that rules were pointless. Second, I am not talking
about what might be called the "law in action" part of Realism. There are
only at the plain meaning of the written language chosen by the parties to interpret their
agreement. If the parties' actual agreement was, in reality, at variance with what they
wrote, the four comers rule would result either in enforcing a deal that was not intended,
or in not enforcing one the parties intended.
39 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539 (1988) (noting that by
excluding discretion, formal rules impede the process of arriving at accurate decisions).
40 Sometimes it seems that there is not much about law that Karl Llewellyn
himself-a notoriously inconsistent thinker-did not say somewhere.
41 MORTON J. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169 (1992).
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some Realists who argued that law should simply be conformed to what
judges actually do. Felix Cohen claimed that to talk about how judges
"ought" to go about finding a contract is meaningless, because the court's
own decision to enforce is what makes the contract in the first place.42 But
this view, even if it were coherent, was not shared by Llewellyn and the
drafters. 43 Llewellyn wanted to overrule some of the decisions that courts
were making, not make the law conform to them. Third, I am not talking
about the simple notion that law should reflect social policy and social needs.
This is, of course, a part of the Realist agenda, but it is hardly unique to
them. Practically everyone for at least the last few hundred years has thought
that law ought to reflect social needs, even though they disagree about what
those needs are and what solutions will meet them. That is why every society
has some lawmaker that issues laws after extensive investigation and
discussion of the law's good and bad points.44
A. Descriptive Realism
As a descriptive matter, Realism is not a kind of jurisprudence, but a
"technology," the point of which is to see the law afresh and "as it works." 45
When a Formalist would ask, "Are the elements of a contract present in this
case?" a Realist would ask, "On the facts of this case, is a court likely to
impose liability?" If the answer is yes, the next logical step for the Realist is
to ask what factors are present that suggest the court will impose liability.
In one sense, this side of Realism was not new. Every practicing lawyer,
even Langdell, knows that many factors other than the legal rules influence
the results in particular cases. These factors include the judge's bias, the
42 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 827-29 (1935).
43 Cohen might argue that the law on the books ought simply to conform to the law
in action. This itself is a normative position. If we can find out what judges are actually
doing ("law in action") we can write it down ("law in books") and thus help people better
predict what courts will do. The law in books does not bind the judge, it merely predicts
what he or she will do. This is a tenable position, but when extended into a general view
of rules it carries implications that are distasteful to many. In the area of coerced
confessions, for example, I suspect most of us believe that police conduct should conform
to the Fifth Amendment, rather than the other way around.
44 People normally differ as to (1) what those needs are and (2) who ought to be
making those decisions. Formalists tend to believe that legislatures should make rules,
while Realists are, in general, much more willing to let judges make these policy calls.
But, note that this is not an ironclad distinction. It was the ostensibly the Formalist judges
of the Lochner court who were, after all, charged with attempting to enact "Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics" into law by judicial fiat. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45 LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 509-10.
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parties' sex or racial and ethnic backgrounds, the lawyers' respective skills,
the ostensibly "irrelevant" equities, the likeability of the parties, the
composition of the jury, the political mood of the day, and even cash bribes
to a judge or jury. Formalists had largely ignored these elements because
they were not supposed to affect the outcomes of cases, and because they
were looking for common threads. Realists wanted to overcome this
narrowness of vision by including these other aspects of the process, a step
forward in descriptive terms.
But, this technological side of Realism is limited. It does not tell us
anything about what a court should do in a case. Descriptive Realism might
tell us, for example, that police officers routinely extort confessions and
manufacture evidence, and that judges knowingly condone the process, but it
cannot tell us whether this practice is wrong. If courts deciding cases are, in
actual fact, relying on abstract notions of "contract" in making their
decisions-or on reading tarot cards or flipping a coin-descriptive Realism
can only note the fact.
Another problem with descriptive Realism is that it is extremely difficult
to do. A thorough understanding of all the factors that affect the result of any
single judicial decision-let alone the factors that affect translation of
judicial decisions into actual real world effects-is an enormous
undertaking. 46 As William Twining wryly noted in describing the loss of
enthusiasm for real empirical work among the early Realists, "realism is hard
work."'47 The size and difficulty of this undertaking may be one reason why
the Formalists tended to ignore the messy details and focus on the one thing
that ostensibly does not change from case to case: the legal rule involved. It
is also presumably why the Realists did very little actual empirical research
into commercial practices when they started on the Code, or, indeed, at any
other time. 48
B. Normative Realism
The other aspect of Realism, conventionally regarded, is normative. To
decide whether a given case is correctly or incorrectly decided, we need
46 Take, for example, the excellent case studies in RICHARD DANZIG & GEOFFREY R.
WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-
KNOWN CASES (2d ed. 2004). The authors invest a considerable amount of effort and do
an admirable job in digging into the realities of cases-but they can manage to do this for
only nine cases. I might add that for the only one of their cases that I have studied,
Hadley v. Baxendale, my own unfinished research suggests that they did not uncover a
great deal of further important information that may have had an influence on the
decision.
47 TWINING, supra note 7, at 59.
48 Id.
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some kind of standard. Take a case that Llewellyn may have had in mind
when he was drafting Article 2, Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.4 9 In
the case, a buyer gets off the hook on a promise to buy a large amount of
rubber, the price of which has fallen substantially, because the acceptance
form did not exactly match the offer form. 50 The case is a quintessential
example of the "mirror-image rule" in contract law,51 and the mirror-image
rule rests firmly on Formalist notions. Is the decision right or wrong as a
matter of moral or social policy? Descriptive Realism cannot tell us. To
conclude that the decision is wrong, as Llewellyn did, we need some kind of
normative standard. What is it?
For Llewellyn, and for commercial law teachers who follow his lead, it
was important that the law consist of what he called "singing rules." 52
Singing rules, unlike "paper rules," are those that carry their "reason and
purpose" on their face.53 In a perfect world, a judge looking at a particular
rule should be able to tell why that rule is there and what results it is
supposed to achieve, so that he or she can tell how it ought to apply to new
factual situations. In this, Llewellyn was following Holmes, 54 who pointed
out that "law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains
is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when
the grounds for desiring that end are stated.., in words." 55 This is in part
because a rule whose purpose is obscure will be hard to apply and its
applications will be difficult to predict, in part because failure to make the
law's purpose explicit is likely to undercut that purpose. As Llewellyn put it,
"covert tools are never reliable tools." 56
49 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915). See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of
the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1318 (1986) (noting that Llewellyn was
considering cases like Poel when designing U.C.C. section 2-207).
50 Poel, 110 N.E. at 620.
51 This is the rule that if an acceptance varies in any respect from the offer, it does
not count as an acceptance, but is rather a counter-offer. No contract is formed until the
original offeror accepts the counter-offer.
52 K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CI. L. REV.
224, 250 (1941).
53 Id.
54See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of
Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 397, 408 (2004) (noting the connection between
Holmes's and Llewellyn's thoughts).
55 Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897); see DiMatteo, supra note 54, at 408.
56 Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939)
(reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
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What purpose is a commercial law regime supposed to further? The
standard account among commercial law teachers is that Llewellyn thought
that the rules should be designed to help business people do business cleanly
and efficiently. This was certainly the ground on which the Code was sold to
the bar and the legislatures. Llewellyn made this point repeatedly in
marketing his vision of a unified Code:
The legal profession needs to have the men of commerce think of law
and legal work, not as a baffling intricacy of ununderstandable [sic]
technicality, but as a helpful device which can be seen, directly, to be
helpful though safety requires the use of a lawyer's skills in developing its
help....
... Commercial law requires to be for consumption by commercial
men, as well as lawyers. 57
The point of the new rules, then, was to replace the tired old
technicalities of the Formalist era with new rules that would better fit modem
commercial practice. Importantly-and this story is still told regularly in
American classrooms-the goal was to help business people. The following
passage gives some flavor of the usual story:
Like [his teacher, Arthur] Corbin, Llewellyn saw no point in legal
doctrine that failed to take account of the nuances and vicissitudes of
everyday commercial practices, which were themselves always in the
process of evolution and change. Fundamentally a pragmatist, Llewellyn
thought that contract doctrine should respond to commercial reality and not,
as the classical theorists imagined, the other way around. 58
Certainly commercial law for Llewellyn (as for the Formalists) was
supposed to do more than simply allow business people to do what they
liked. In Article 2 he built in a number of provisions that restricted their
powers more or less explicitly. But, it seems safe to say that each and every
provision of Article 2 is supposed to be justified either as (1) facilitating free
exchange among parties, or (2) furthering some other overriding public
interest that we have decided outweighs the interest in facilitating free
exchange. To say it differently, a rule of commercial law ought on this
analysis to be either the one that the parties themselves would choose to help
them do business better, or one expressly designed to override their own
preferences in favor of some larger interest. A rule that interferes with free
57 Karl Llewellyn, Memorandum, The Reasons for a Uniform Commercial Code
(undated c. 1940), quoted in TWINING, supra note 7, at 524-25.
58 Patterson, supra note 11, at 171 (footnotes omitted).
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contracting without achieving any specific regulatory purpose would be, on
this analysis, bad.
Many kinds of restrictions on contractual freedom might meet that
second criterion. Among the most obvious are rules on capacity, illegal
contracts, and consumer protection. Others might, perhaps, be justified in
increasing economic efficiency 59 or promoting other social goals. But, for the
Realist committed to promoting free economic exchange, the reasons for
such restrictions ought to be apparent on their face.
With that background, let's turn to the product of Llewellyn's work,
Article 2.
IV. THE REALITIES OF ARTICLE 2
We will focus here not on what Llewellyn and his colleagues said, but
upon what they actually created. What do we find when we look at Article 2?
Do we see a statute whose provisions reflect deep familiarity with
commercial practices and the interests of merchants? Do the rules help
business people carry out their daily tasks without being fretted by legal
uncertainty? Do the rules lead to a swift, reliable, cost-effective resolution of
disputes? Do the rules sing out their reasons? Do they create the kind of
simple, predictable system that facilitates contracting and lowers the costs of
doing business?
Before we start, I should note that there are some general reasons to
believe that they do not. There are, in fact, good reasons for thinking that
Article 2 is no better at dealing with commercial realities than the system it
supplanted.
First, as noted above, the drafters of the Code undertook no serious
empirical research before they went about rewriting the whole face of
commercial law, and some (like Gilmore) were very nearly ignorant of the
subject before they started work. For these drafters, "[t]he library and the
armchair were... more attractive than the market place and the courts." 60
This is a weakness for a statute that is supposed to be based not on what legal
experts discern by reading cases, but on the actual practices of business
people. To the extent that the drafters received input from actual merchants
engaged in actual business practices, the merchants turned out to be opposed
to most of the innovations.61 Llewellyn, the principal draftsman, was noted
59 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 99-100 (1989) (arguing that default
rules should be set in such a way as to compel parties to disclose information to each
other to increase efficiency).
60 TwINING, supra note 7, at 58.
61 Llewellyn's struggle to convince merchants of the usefulness of his innovations is
detailed in Wiseman, supra note 18, at 519-38.
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for his aversion to fieldwork, and had a total of two years of law practice as a
very junior associate doing bank work during the Harding Administration. 62
He does not seem to have been regarded by the practicing lawyers as having
much familiarity with commercial practice. 63
Second, one of the great virtues of the common law, as Llewellyn
himself recognized in other contexts, is its flexibility to adapt to changes in
practice. 64 A justification for the new Code was that the old Uniform Sales
Act of 190665 had already become "outdated" by 1940.66 But, our present
Article 2 is a 1960s enactment of a 1950s statute largely written in the 1940s
and reflecting the ideas of the 1930s. There is at least some reason to suspect
that there might be problems in fitting today's vibrant and developing world
of business into a Procrustean bed designed for a World War II economy. 67
Third, since the enactment of the Code, the part of the national economy
subject to its provisions has not been noticeably more efficient or productive
than the parts that remain shackled to the bad old common law. The
explosive growth in the services and software sectors, and the boom in real
estate, all of which are outside the Code's scope, seem not to have suffered
from the lack of a modem statute that reflects "commercial reality."
Fourth, the sales of nearly every good complicated or expensive enough
to warrant a written contract (sales of goods over $500 must be in writing to
be enforceable under the Code) are done on forms that explicitly reject many
or all of the key provisions of Article 2. Realists liked to claim that the old
common law and the Sales Act had been based on a "prototypical" face-to-
face exchange that did not involve future promises, while "modem" reality
was that most commercial contracts were done at a distance and involved
future performance. 68 Yet it is precisely these face-to-face nineteenth century
transactions (e.g., customer buys groceries at a store and brings them home)
in which the parties are most likely to get the Article 2 default rules, and the
62 TWINING, supra note 7, at 101, 155. In co-authoring his book on the legal
institutions of the Cheyenne, Llewellyn spent a total of ten days in the field with the
Cheyenne, leaving the rest of the work to his colleague. The book is K.N. LLEWELLYN &
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
63 Kamp, supra note 17, at 394.
64 TWINING, supra note 7, at 5-6.
65 Uniform Sales Act, reprinted in JOHN BARKER WAITE, THE LAW OF SALES 285-
336 (1921) [hereinafter U.S.A.].
66 John L. Gedid, U C. C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 357 (1987).
67 Maybe Karl Llewellyn was prescient enough in 1941 to design a fixed and largely
unchangeable uniform code that better reflects actual commercial practice in 2006 than a
system the common law courts would have evolved-or maybe not.
68 Wiseman, supra note 18, at 475-76.
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modem model (e.g., ordering a computer over the Internet) in which the
default rules will be almost entirely unimportant. Any review of the purchase
orders used by sophisticated buyers and sellers will suggest that few of them
are comfortable with the default terms of the Code.
Fifth, in retrospect it is clear that the drafters of Article 2 were wildly
wrong about the likely litigation costs under the Code. Llewellyn himself
thought that under his system litigation would "wither away." 69 That has not
happened. A fixed rule riddled with exceptions may be cumbersome and
annoying and lead to unnecessary litigation, but it turns out that replacing it
with a "reasonable" standard-as the Code frequently does--does not cut
litigation costs.
Sixth, actual merchants who have sales disputes have been fleeing the
courts in record numbers since the Code was adopted, opting for arbitration
instead of putting their disputes in front of the wise and learned judge
applying Llewellyn's Article 2. Litigation costs are certainly a major reason
for the move, but it is striking to see how many business people want to run
away from a "business-friendly" statute ostensibly designed to carry out the
real intentions of the parties. Significantly, this is true not only in business-
to-consumer transactions, where we might suspect the stronger party to take
advantage of the weaker, but even in business-to-business deals between
large and sophisticated enterprises. Interestingly, when business people set
up their own arbitration regimes, they seem to follow legal rules that often
vary a great deal from Llewellyn's concepts of business reality. 70
I am not saying here that Article 2 is responsible for the relative decline
of the American manufacturing sector or the drastic reduction in commercial
law cases that reach the courts. I am merely pointing out that when we strip
away the rhetoric there is no obvious evidence that Article 2 is a more
commerce-friendly law than the system it displaced, and there is no
particular reason to conclude that it has been more successful than would a
system based on the common law, a moderately updated Uniform Sales Act,
or specific legislation dealing with particular problems.
To illustrate the points that I am making, I will focus on four areas. To a
much larger extent than is usually acknowledged, Article 2 is simply a
recodification of the prior common law and Sales Act rules. The received
view is that the Sales Act was "a monument to the conceptual thinking
inherent in Langdellian legal science," and "void of any workable rules." 71
Yet a great many features we teach in Article 2 exist in nearly identical form
69 Kamp, supra note 12, at 381.
70 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1769-70 (1995)
(describing how merchants interpret contracts in their own arbitration system).
71 DiMatteo, supra note 54, at 429.
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in the Sales Act. Take, for example, the question of what happens when the
parties have obviously made a contract but the price has not been agreed to.
Here is the U.C.C. provision:
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even
though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price
at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other
standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or
recorded. 72
Here is the provision from the unworkable Sales Act:
(1) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in
such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined by the course of
dealing between the parties.
(4) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the foregoing
provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price
is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each particular
case.73
The Sales Act language, incidentally, is virtually identical to that in the
even more reviled (on this side of the Atlantic, anyway) British Sale of
Goods Act of 1893. 74
There are a great many other pieces of Article 2 that are taken virtually
intact from the Sales Act. Among them are the ability to make a contract by
any means, including conduct;75 what counts as an express warranty; 76 the
warranties of title, fitness for particular purpose, and merchantability; 77 the
power of one with voidable title to transfer good title;78 the primary duties of
buyers and sellers; 79 what counts as a buyer's "acceptance"; 80 sellers' self-
72 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2002).
73 U.S.A., supra note 65, § 9(1), (4).
74 Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71 (Eng.), available at
www.attorneygeneral.ie (Search "Sale of Goods Act of 1893"; then follow "Sale of
Goods Acts 1893 and Part II of 1980 Restatement" hyperlink).
75 U.S.A., supra note 65, § 3.
76 Id. § 12. The Article 2 version is a little broader, but the concept is very similar.
See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2002).
77 U.S.A., supra note 65, §§ 13, 15(1)-(2)
78 Id. § 24.
7 9 1d. §41.
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help rights when unpaid; 81 sellers' remedies of action for the price, and
damages for non-acceptance; 82 buyers' damages remedy for non-delivery,
right to specific performance, and remedies for breach of warranty; 83 and
supplementation by the law merchant and other rules of law and equity. 84
Although Llewellyn claimed that the "central concept" of the prior Sales Act
"was the present sale of present goods, about which the seller made no
promises,"8 5 this is simply untrue. Not only did sellers under the Sales Act
make future promises very similar to those under the U.C.C., but the statute
specifically included goods not yet manufactured or acquired by the seller.8 6
If these are not "workable rules," then Article 2 is not workable. If they are
rules of Langdellian Formalism, then much of Article 2 is Langdellian. If
they are Realist, then Samuel Williston was a Realist.
I will therefore focus on four areas where Article 2 does make major
departures from the prior law: (1) the new approach to creating contracts
through exchange of forms; (2) reduction of the requirement of certainty and
the greater use of default terms; (3) the mandatory merchant duty of good
faith; and (4) the vastly increased importance of evidence of merchant
practices in setting contractual obligations. Each of these Article 2
innovations worked a minor revolution in contract law. Each of them has
been praised for their intent, if not (in the case of the formation principles)
the actual embodiment that the intent took. If any part of Article 2 ought to
show the Realism of the drafters, it should be these.8 7
A. Contract Formation
It may seem unfair to start a critique of Article 2's Realism with its
contract formation principles, because even the Code's most ardent fans
recognize that in this area its provisions are at best badly flawed. The
centerpiece of the Code's formation principles-and one of its biggest
80 Id. § 48.
81 Id. §§ 52-60.
82 Id. §§ 63-64.
83 U.S.A., supra note 65, §§ 67-69.
84 Id. § 73.
85 W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 133 (1996).
86 U.S.A., supra note 65, at § 5.
87 Other innovations in Article 2, like the elimination of the concept of title as
regards to risk of loss, are in my view relatively minor and could have been achieved by
some simple tinkering with the Sales Act. One major innovation is the creation of the
explicit doctrine of unconscionablity in section 2-302. From an analytical perspective,
this is little more than an explicit reallocation of power between parties, a protective
device unrelated to Realism.
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innovations-is section 2-207. Even those who admire the drafters' vision
criticize the "miserable, bungled, patched-up job" 88 that they actually
produced. As one district judge noted:
Unfortunately, the section resulting from so noble a purpose is
uniformly misunderstood and criticized for its obscurity. Referred to as "a
murky bit of prose," and "like the amphibious tank that was originally
designed to fight in the swamps, but was ultimately sent to fight in the
desert," § 2-207 is a defiant, lurking demon patiently waiting to condemn its
interpreters to the depths of despair.89
The point here is not that section 2-207, as it actually emerged from the
drafting rooms, is a mess. The point is that even if section 2-207 worked
perfectly, it would not be a "Realist" innovation in any recognizable sense.
1. The Common Law
Under the common law, an offer could be accepted only on its own
terms. An acceptance that purported to vary the terms of the deal in any way
did not count as an acceptance, but instead was a counter-offer. This "mirror-
image rule" worked well enough before the development of standard contract
forms. But once contracts began to be made by exchange of forms with
different terms-known as the "battle of the forms" problem-the rule meant
that so long as neither party had performed, there was no contract if the
parties' forms contained different terms. If the parties had performed, then
the performance acted as an acceptance of the last form sent before the
performance, a result usually called the "last-shot" rule.
The common law approach gave rise to two alleged problems. First, a
"welsher"90 might use different terms in the acceptance and offer as an
excuse to escape a deal that was no longer attractive on other grounds. This
was the fact pattern of Poel,91 where it appears the buyer wanted out because
the price of rubber had fallen. Second, the last party to send a form before
performance was entitled to its own terms, no matter how one-sided, because
of the last-shot rule. A good example of this kind of case is Vaughan's Seed
88 Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), in RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, ROBERT S. SUMMERS & JAMES J. WHITE, SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS:
TEACHING MATERIALS 514 (5th ed. 1993).
89 Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (E.D.
Pa. 1984).
90 While this term may be offensive, there is no ready synonym for it and thus its
use persists in commercial circles. See, e.g., James J. White, Contracting Under Amended
2-207, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 723, 727.
91 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 620 (N.Y. 1915).
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Store, Inc. v. Morris April & Bros.,92 where a buyer was stuck with a seller's
disclaimer of warranties because the seller's form was the last one sent
before performance.
It is not clear why the drafters were so eager to change these rules. After
all, there had been no studies showing that the rules were causing serious
problems-or, in fact any problems-with commerce. Nor were there even a
significant number of anecdotal complaints. When Llewellyn actually talked
to merchants, he learned that they did not consider the welsher to be much of
a problem.93 Merchants seem to have expressed no problems with the
traditional mirror-image/last-shot rule. This is not surprising, since neither
before nor after the Code was promulgated have there been any serious
studies on whether or not the mirror-image rule is good or bad. The services,
real estate, and intellectual property portions of the U.S. economy have
managed to get along with it reasonably well; many sophisticated foreign
legal systems use it; the treaty that governs the international sales of goods
by U.S. firms adopts it.94 There seems to be no good reason to believe that
the change was necessary to meet any commercial needs.
Whatever reason there is seems to rest on the opinion of Llewellyn and
others that the results in particular appellate decisions, like Poel, were
wrong.95 Whether or not merchants were concerned about welshers, such
malefactors plainly offended Llewellyn's Frank Capra notions of fair play.
Merchants told him that they could police the problem of the welsher
informally themselves by simply refusing to deal with those who act in bad
faith. Nevertheless, Llewellyn wanted to add a legal sanction-not because
anyone was demanding it, but because it suited his own moral sense.
2. Section 2-207
The result was section 2-207, which worked a revolution in contract
formation. Briefly stated, section 2-207 reverses the common law last-shot
rule. A "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" will create an
acceptance "even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered. '96 Under the common law, if the buyer's purchase order
incorporated a warranty and the seller's response disclaimed a warranty-
92 7 A.2d 868, 869 (N.J. 1939).
93 Wiseman, supra note 18, at 526.
94 See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
art. 19, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
95 See Murray, supra note 49, at 1320 (noting that Poel was one of the cases
Llewellyn had in mind in drafting section 2-207).
96 U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002).
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this was the situation in Vaughan's Seed Store97-there would be no contract
if neither party had yet performed. Either party could at this point back out. If
the parties had performed, the seller's warranty disclaimer, included in the
last form, would control. Under section 2-207, however, the seller's response
would be considered an acceptance even though it disclaimed the warranty,
and a contract would be formed even before any performance. 98 The seller's
warranty disclaimer would be ineffective because it had accepted the buyer's
warranty term and its own clause would be merely a proposal for a
modification, which would not be included unless the buyer accepted it.99 In
such a case, a seller who did not intend to warrant its goods and prominently
included a disclaimer of warranties in its own form would nevertheless be
held to have agreed to give a warranty. This situation is sometimes called the
"first-shot" rule, because the party who sends the first form gets the benefits
previously enjoyed by the party who sent the last form100
But let us pause for a minute. What exactly does it mean to "accept" an
offer? How exactly can a communication that says, in effect, "We will be
happy to sell you the goods you requested except that we will not provide a
warranty," mean that, "We agree to sell you these goods, including the
warranty you request?" To treat a response that contains any but the most
trivial alternative terms as an "acceptance" means one of three things. Either
(1) we do not care whether one party is willing to be bound by any particular
set of terms, because we believe the terms the lawyers put in merchants'
standard form contracts are immaterial; (2) we do not care whether one party
is willing to be bound because we have for some reason decided to override
the party's expressed wishes; or (3) we believe that there is some
"agreement" or "contract" out there that has an existence independent of the
actual expressions and desires of the parties.
97 Vaughan's Seed Store, 7 A.2d at 869.
98 U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002).
99 1 am grossly simplifying the actual workings of section 2-207; the analysis may
be complicated by whether the variant terms are considered to be "additional" or merely
"different." The complexities and nuances take up about twenty pages in JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 29-48 (5th ed. 2000).
100 There are some who disagree that section 2-207 adopts a first-shot rule; they
offer a version in which both the buyer's and the seller's terms drop out and the contract
is made on terms that neither party sought or expected, the default provisions of Article 2.
Judge Posner has suggested that this "knock out" rule is the majority position in courts
today. See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994). It is fair
to say that this approach relies on a loose reading of section 2-207, something to which
the Seventh Circuit is prone. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150
(7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997) (holding that despite its express
language and comments, section 2-207 does not apply unless there are at least two forms
exchanged).
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As to the first alternative, is there any evidence that this is the case? Do
business people really not care about the terms they have paid lawyers good
money to put in their agreements? Perhaps surprisingly, there have been very
few studies of that issue. 101 Llewellyn himself seems to have been firmly of,
the opinion that most contract boilerplate was inflicted by lawyers on
unwitting clients who not only did not need those terms, but who were
actually disadvantaged by them. For Llewellyn, "the evil to be avoided was
the practice of business lawyers who 'tend to draft to the edge of the
possible,' insisting on 'having all kinds of things that their clients don't want
at all.' ' 102 But there is very little evidence that "clients don't want" the terms
their lawyers have included. Some of the most famous contract law cases of
the last few decades involve companies spending large amounts of time,
effort, and money to enforce boilerplate terms that their buyers claimed did
not become part of the contract. 10 3
Llewellyn seems to have thought that because business people often
resolve disputes informally without recourse to the contract terms, the terms
are unimportant to them. But this does not follow. Most international
disputes, for example, are solved without recourse to armed forces, but that
does not mean that armed forces are irrelevant or that it does not matter to
diplomats what forces are available.
Lisa Bernstein and others have shown that there is a difference between
what one is willing to do, and what one is willing to be legally bound to do,
and recent studies have shown that business people, when they create their
own dispute resolution mechanisms, put much more stress on boilerplate
terms than most lawyers would expect. 104 As Llewellyn learned when he
101 One that is still routinely cited is Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963), which reflects interviews
with only forty-three Wisconsin-connected manufacturers and six law firms during the
Kennedy Administration. A recent review of the literature suggests that not much has
happened since Macaulay wrote. See Russell B. Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in
Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1033.
102 John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 869, 887-88 n.86 (2002) (quoting 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW
REvIsION COMMISSION REPORT: HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 49, 113
(1954)). This particular passage actually refers to the unconscionability provision in the
proposed section 2-302, but Llewellyn viewed sections 2-302 and 2-207 as different
approaches to dealing with a single problem. See Murray, supra note 49, at 1321-22.
103 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (involving
choice of forum provision printed on cruise ship ticket); Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147 (involving
arbitration clause contained in booklet that was delivered to the buyer with a computer);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving a software license
enclosed within a box of off-the-shelf software).
104 See Bernstein, supra note 70, at 1791-92; Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis ofArticle 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L.
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tried to foist a rule of "substantial performance" on merchants in lieu of the
perfect tender rule, 105 there is a difference between a merchant's willingness
to accept a defective shipment and a merchant's willingness to be forced to
accept a defective shipment.
With respect to the second possible reason, what exactly is the policy
reason for imposing a contract in a situation where neither party has yet
performed and they do not agree on their terms? After all, if boilerplate terms
are unimportant, merchants who lose a few sales when the other party backs
out will soon stop putting them on their forms. Why is society better off by
imposing legal liability instead of letting the parties go their own ways? Why
are scarce public resources devoted to solving a problem the parties could
have solved easily themselves? If this is a specific normative choice, we
ought to be able to see clearly what the reason is, but the literature is
remarkably scant on this issue.
The third reason seems to imply that the agreement of the parties is
something other than what the parties have, themselves, actually expressed.
The Code refers to this curious concept as the "bargain in fact."'10 6 John
Murray-certainly the leading authority on section 2-207--explains it this
way:
Llewellyn was concerned with the "bargain-in-fact" of the parties and
believed that the identification of the factual bargain (the agreement) of the
parties should not be fettered with technical rules of pre-Code classical
contract law, because the application of these technical rules might well
lead to a failure to recognize the true agreement or understanding of the
parties. Article 2 -can be appreciated only with an understanding of this
underlying philosophy. 107
There is something eerily metaphysical about this explanation. Floating
somewhere out there, independent of what the parties themselves have said,
there is some "true agreement" of the parties. A wise judge, like any good
tribal shaman, can discover the "true agreement" hidden in the hearts of the
parties, despite what the parties themselves have actually said. In the world
of the "bargain in fact," a seller who has disclaimed a warranty in the clearest
possible language has nevertheless managed to "agree" to give the buyer a
warranty.
This "bargain in fact" is a fiction. It is, moreover, a fiction that masks
what is actually happening: contractual liability is being imposed on a party
in the complete absence of that party's agreement. There may be good
REv. 710, 713 n.13 (1999).
105 Wiseman, supra note 18, at 526-27.
106 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2002).
107 JoHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 10 at 23 (4th ed. 2001).
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reasons for doing this. There may be situations where it is unavoidable. But
we are not saying clearly what we are doing. Instead of saying forthrightly,
"for the following good and sufficient reasons we are going to impose
contractual liability on you even though you have not agreed to it," we
pretend that on some astral plane you have actually agreed to the imposition.
3. Reality and Rhetoric
Why this resort to subterfuge? I suspect that it is because if it were
necessary to spell out the "good and sufficient reasons" why liability should
be imposed, the drafters would have been hard-pressed to come up with
reasons that would have impressed the ostensible consumers of their new
Code, the merchant community. Indeed, the drafters would have been hard
pressed to come up with any plausible reasons why a first-shot rule is
superior to a last-shot rule, or why a knock-out rule, sticking parties with
terms neither wanted, might be superior to either. 10 8 By acting as if we are
somehow not imposing terms on the parties, but rather carrying out their own
secret desires, we can avoid these troublesome questions.
Let us take a conventional explanation for why the mirror-image rule had
to be discarded. This is Murray again, in one of his justifiably well-known
and influential articles on section 2-207:
The Poel case exemplified the "battle of the forms" problem, which
Karl Llewellyn "dearly loved." During the New York Law Revision
Commission's study of the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn stated:
"Those unhappy cases which find a condition where no businessman would
find one are carefully disapproved." A reasonable seller in the Poel situation
would not have discovered any condition to the buyer's acceptance
expressed in the purchase order response to the seller's offer. A technical
bar to finding a contract led the court of appeals to find that no contract had
been made. The parties' factual bargain was ignored. The buyer was
permitted to operate in bad faith, and the result unfairly surprised and
oppressed the seller. 10 9
When we read this passage closely, however, it boils down to a series of
conclusions and adjectives." 0 There seems to be some underlying and
108 It has been argued that section 2-207 does not even do a better job at dealing
with the welsher problem than did the old mirror-image rule. See Douglas G. Baird &
Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-
207,68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1223 (1982).
109 Murray, supra note 49, at 1318.
110 Note the use of the value-loaded phrases "technical bar," "factual bargain," and
"oppressed." It is unusual to think of New York commodity dealers as a group
particularly subject to oppression.
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unstated normative view here, but it is not out in the open. At issue in Poel
were the buyer's prominently labeled "CONDITIONS" on its form."I I The
form noted that it was not clear that firm delivery dates had been agreed to,
and one of the conditions demanded prompt acknowledgment of the order as
a guarantee that delivery dates could be met. 112 These provisions were
included on the very purchase order the buyer had submitted to the seller.
Why would a "reasonable seller" not be aware of them? Given the doubt
expressed by the buyer, what was the "factual bargain" as to when the rubber
would be delivered, the dates previously mentioned or some others? Would a
seller have been bound even if it had said in response to the inquiry that it
could not deliver on those dates? If a buyer had not received the prompt
acknowledgment and decided to buy its rubber elsewhere, would it still be on
the hook?
Thus, [continues Murray] the holding in Poel was diametrically
opposed to the underlying philosophy of what was to become Article 2, and
the case provided an excellent illustration of why classical contract law
needed to be modified substantially in the new contract law Llewellyn
contemplated. This new contract law would insist upon recognizing the
contract as reflecting the "commercial understanding" of the parties. If the
parties reasonably believed that their deal "has in fact been closed," it
would be treated as having been legally closed, regardless of classical
contract law's technical shackles. The paradigm would be an offeree's
response that, to a reasonable merchant, appeared to be an acceptance even
though the response contained terms that varied the terms of the offer.
Notwithstanding such variant terms, if a reasonable offeror would view the
response as an acceptance, it would be an acceptance. 113
Note here the use of "commercial understanding," as if it has some
obvious and ascertainable independent meaning, and "the parties reasonably
believed their deal 'has in fact been closed,"' as if we have some method of
reading their minds apart from their exchange of correspondence. And why
have we decided that the key is what the offeror thinks? Why isn't the test
whether the offeree thinks it has accepted the offer? Is there some particular
reason to privilege the offeror in these circumstances? What reason is there
to decide that offeree A is bound simply because offeror B reasonably thinks
A is bound?
This passage illustrates the problem with the Realist rhetoric. Under
section 2-207 we are, for some reason, going to impose liability on the buyer
in Poel. But talking about "commercial understandings" and the "reasonable
I11 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 621 (N.Y. 1915).
112 Id.
113 Murray, supra note 49, at 1318-19.
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beliefs" of two parties who have said different things does not help us to
understand why we are doing so.
B. Uncertainty and Default Terms
A second major innovation of Article 2 is its abandonment-or at lkast
its minimization-of the common law requirements of certainty.
1. The Common Law and the Uniform Sales Act
At common law, the rule was that for a contract to be enforceable its
terms had to be reasonably definite. Where the parties themselves had not
agreed, a court could not in most cases supply a term. As the New York
Court of Appeals put it:
It is elementary in the law that, for the validity of a contract, the
promise or the agreement of the parties to it must be certain and explicit,
and that their full intention may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of
certainty. Their agreement must be neither vague nor indefinite, and, if thus
defective, parol proof cannot be resorted to. 114
Thus, common law courts regularly denied effect to contracts where it
was not clear exactly what the parties had agreed to. In United Press v. New
York Press Co., for example, the contract was to provide news services for
eight years at a monthly price "not exceeding $300 a week," but the court
found the clause too indefinite even though the buyer had paid exactly $300 a
week for nearly two years before backing out of the deal. 15 In Fairplay
School Township v. 0 'Neal, a contract between a school board and a teacher
that the latter would work for one year for "good wages" was held
unenforceable on the ground that no one could tell exactly what "good
wages" were, the court noting in passing that even "fair wages" would have
been insufficiently certain. 116 n Dayton v. Stone, a contract to sell all the
goods and fixtures of a store was held too indefinite because the parties could
not agree on the price to be paid for certain damaged merchandise. 117 The
result was similar in Bluemner v. Garvin,118 which involved an agreement to
"fairly share" a building commission with the architect who designed the
building. 1' 9 In situations where performance had been rendered, such as in
114 United Press v. N.Y. Press Co., 58 N.E. 527, 528 (N.Y. 1900).
115 Id. at 527, 529.
116 Fairplay Sch. Twp. v. O'Neal, 26 N.E. 686, 686-87 (Ind. 1891).
117 Dayton v. Stone, 69 N.W. 515, 516 (Mich. 1896).




Bluemner, these common law courts would grant a quantum meruit recovery.
Where the agreement was still executory, as in United Press and Fairplay,
the court would leave the parties to go their own ways.
Certainly the common law and the prior statutes relating to sales of
goods did not require absolute certainty. As noted above, the "outdated"
Uniform Sales Act actually had a number of default provisions, many similar
to those in the Code, that courts would supply if the parties did not. Thus, if
no time for a particular act was fixed, courts would assume that it must be
done "within a reasonable time."'120 If the parties did not specify a place for
delivery, it was the seller's place of business. 121 If the parties did not specify
a price, courts could supply it through prior course of dealing or even, in
some circumstances, "a reasonable price" found by the court as "a question
of fact."122
2. The Article 2 Approach
Such default rules seem to have been used relatively sparingly. It was
one of the goals of the Code's drafters to avoid the results of cases like those
above, in which parties escaped liability on the grounds of indefiniteness.
Why? The most likely reason is concern about the same welsher problem that
motivated the drafting of section 2-207. As with section 2-207, there seems
to be no evidence that the commercial world was seriously troubled by this
situation. The kinds of cases where the contract was held to be unenforceable
for indefiniteness tended to be either those like Dayton123 and Wittkowsky &
Rintels v. Wasson,124 where it was unclear that the parties had reached a
definitive deal, or those like United Press125 or Fairplay,126 where the parties
themselves could have easily avoided the problem by simply naming the
price or providing a formula instead of using phrases like "good wages"'127 or
"not exceeding."' 128
120 U.S.A., supra note 65, §§ 19(3), 44(2), 48 (1906).
121 Id. § 43(1).
122 Id. § 9(4).
123 Dayton v. Stone, 69 N.W. 515 (Mich. 1896).
124 71 N.C. 451, 456 (1874) (holding that where parties had specified neither a price
nor a means by which a price could be computed, there was no contract).
125 United Press v. N.Y. Press Co., 58 N.E. 527, 528 (N.Y. 1900).
126 Fairplay Sch. Twp. v. O'Neal, 26 N.E. 686, 687 (Ind. 1897).
127 Id. at 686.
128 United Press, 58 N.E. at 527. If the parties resorted to such terms because they
could not agree on an appropriate figure, there is even less reason for a court to pick one
for them, since there was never any agreement on the subject at all.
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Allowing defendants in these cases to escape liability may certainly have
allowed some parties to renege on their own commitments. The potential for
bad faith is nicely illustrated by that contracts casebook staple, Varney v.
Ditmars, 12 9 in which an employer induced a worker to stay with him through
the holidays by promising him a "fair share" of the profits. 130 The employer
later fired the employee and refused to pay any profits, and the court held
that the agreement was too indefinite to be enforced.' 31 But the potential for
bad faith was, in practice, seriously undercut by the availability of quantum
meruit recovery in cases like Varney132 and Bluemner133 where services had
actually been performed.
Despite the lack of any groundswell of commercial need, Article 2's
solution to the problem is the formation provision in section 2-204. The
provision says: "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract."'1 34 It goes on to state in
subsection 3: "Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy."'135 A later provision makes it very clear that, contrary to cases like
United Press, the contract is not too indefinite merely because the parties
have not agreed on either a price or a method for calculating it.13 6
Let's look at this more closely. A contract for sale, it says, does not fail
for indefiniteness if "the parties have intended to make a contract. ' 137 What
does that mean? It seems to suggest that the intent of the parties-both
parties-is to play some significant role in the process. But a "contract," says
the Code, "as distinguished from 'agreement' means the total legal obligation
that results from the parties' agreement as determined by [the U.C.C.] as
supplemented by any other applicable laws."'1 38 It sounds like the parties'
"agreement" is only a part of the "contract." What does it mean for parties to
have intended a "total legal obligation" that is greater than their agreement?
That depends on what the Code means by "agreement." An "agreement,
as distinguished from 'contract,' means the bargain of the parties in fact, as
129 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916).
130 Id. at 823.
131 Id. at 825.
132 Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916).
133 Bluemner v. Garvin, 104 N.Y.S. 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907).
134 U.C.C. § 2-204 (2002).
135Id.
136 Id. § 2-305.
137 Id. § 2-204.
138 Id. § 1-201(12).
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found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade."' 139 The parties
have "intended to make a contract" for purposes of section 2-204 if they have
intended to enter into a "total legal obligation" that results from some kind of
bargain in fact, as found by the court in their language or inferred by the
court from other circumstances, as determined by the Uniform Commercial
Code or "any other applicable law."
Boiled down to its essence, this means that the parties have "intended to
make a contract" if the court decides that they have actually entered into a
relationship that the court concludes is a contract, even if they each believe
they have agreed to something different, and even if one or both do not
believe they have a deal at all. 140 As noted above, it is hard to see how sellers
who believe they have sold goods "as is," disclaiming all warranties, can be
said to have "intended" to enter into a contract in which they provided a
warranty of merchantability. Under section 2-204, the seller's actual intent to
assume any part of this "total legal obligation" turns out to be irrelevant. The
parties have made a contract if the court concludes that they have made a
contract.
The second part of section 2-204(3) also has problems. It says that a
court can enforce a contract if there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
"appropriate remedy."' 141 But exactly what remedy is "appropriate"? Does it
depend on what the parties have agreed to? If so, then finding that a seller
has given a warranty when the seller plainly tried to disclaim it would be
inappropriate. If not, then we ought to admit that we are not looking at the
actual agreement of the parties at all-certainly not to some fictional
"bargain in fact"-but to some general norms that we have decided for some
reason to impose by legislation on parties. It may be a good thing to impose
warranty obligations on sellers who disclaim them, or to deny warranties to
buyers who think they have them, but it has nothing to do with the "intent" of
the parties.
One obvious reason for imposing obligations on unwilling parties might
be that in some cases it is impossible for the parties to walk away from the
deal. If a buyer of grain thinks it got a warranty of merchantability and the
seller thinks it did not give one, and the grain has already been baked into
bread that is not saleable, one party will inevitably be stuck with a contract
term it did not agree to. Some policy other than the intent of the parties needs
to be resorted to. But the policy issues in cases like that are very different
139 Id. § 1-201(3).
140 At the time the negotiations are underway, at any event. After the fact, a party
may have reason to claim a deal had in fact been struck when subsequent events make it
advantageous to do so.
141 U.C.C. § 2-204 (2002).
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from those in a case like Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America,
Inc. 142 Nora Beverages involved an entirely executory undertaking in which
draft contracts were circulated but never signed, no goods were ever
delivered, and the parties had not even agreed on the duration of a proposed
multi-year contract or the quantities that would be supplied each year. 143 Yet
the court managed to find an enforceable contract that bound the buyer. 144
There may be good reason for courts to create contracts for parties who, have
not themselves agreed to them, but the reasons for such decisions ought to
sing out, not lie hidden in pretense about the "intent" of the parties.
C. Good Faith
One of the major innovations of the Code is the creation of a standard of
merchant "good faith" in contracting. Merchant "good faith," for purposes of
Article 2, means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 145
1. Common Law
At common law there is generally no obligation to deal with another in
good faith, at least insofar as there is no dishonesty or deliberate intent to
harm the other party, and no fiduciary relationship between the parties.
Under classic contract law, a party was free to break off negotiations for any
reason, including getting a better price from someone else. A party was also
free to take actions under a contract in the party's own economic interest
without regard to the effects on the other party, so long as it complied exactly
with what it promised to do.
Obviously, the law of fraud and various equitable doctrines like estoppel
provided some limitations on this doctrine, but by and large the only duties
parties owed each other were those that were reflected in their contract. 146 If
a party carried out its contractual obligations to the letter, then it had no other
duties to the other party. And it was irrelevant if the party breached its
agreement, its good faith, or lack thereof. The extreme version of this idea is
142 164 F.3d 736 (2d Cir. 1998).
143 Id. at 747-48.
144 Id. at 752.
145 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2002).
146 There were also a small number of cases where a good-faith duty was imposed
as the means of finding consideration and making a deal enforceable at all. The most
famous example is Woodv. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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reflected in Holmes's observation that a contract was, in effect, an option,
and that the party could choose either to perform or to pay damages. 147
2. Good Faith in Article 2
One of Llewellyn's most cherished goals in enacting the Code was to
create a duty of good faith that would apply among merchants. Consistent
with his views about the welsher (and his concept of Jimmy Stewart in It's a
Wonderful Life as the prototypical business person), Llewellyn was deeply
concerned with what he considered to be predatory business people who
would abuse the rules of contract to gain unfair advantages over others. He
wanted to promote "mercantile decency" and to protect merchants against
"mercantile injustice"'148
Again, the question is why? After all, there are a great many areas of life
in our society where there is no enforceable duty of good faith. My wife need
not act in good faith in deciding to abandon me for another man. I am not
legally bound to act in good faith in refusing to pay private school tuition for
my son. My mother need not act reasonably or in good faith when she
decides to leave her property to my brother, or St. Jude's Hospital, or her cat.
The politician for whom I vote has no enforceable obligation to act in good
faith, nor does the newspaper reporter who attacks the politician, so long as
he or she sticks scrupulously to the truth. I have no good faith obligation to
refuse a better offer from my employer's competitor-no matter how much
harm my departure will cause-nor, in most jurisdictions, does my employer
have a good faith duty to keep me if it finds a better or cheaper
replacement. 149 Since I am not a merchant, I have no duty of good faith
(beyond mere "honesty in fact") to my best friend when I sell him my lemon
of a car. Of all of these various social situations, the one in which we are
least likely to expect one party to act in good faith to protect the interests of
the other party is an arm's length commercial sale of goods transaction
between sophisticated firms. Yet this is precisely the area where Llewellyn
wanted to impose a duty of good faith.
Why do we have such a rule for merchants? Had those involved in
commerce discovered any pressing need for it? Were victimized merchants
clamoring for legal protection from competitors who act in bad faith? No. In
fact, so far as there is evidence from the time, they were adamantly opposed
to any such idea:
147 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,
462 (1897).
148 Wiseman, supra note 18, at 510.
149 Unless, of course, the quitting violates a specific term of the agreement, or the
firing violates the agreement or some statutory protection.
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Bernard Broeker, who represented Bethlehem Steel, expressed the
hard-bargaining mood of business: "I see no reason why I should not be
allowed to make an unreasonable contract .... Quite often I know each
party to a contract thinks there are some unreasonable provisions in it, but it
is the best deal he can make." As to the good faith requirement, the
American Bar Association's response was "Why should the Code draftsman
tell us to be good?" Business did not want any increase in potential liability,
created.., by an objective good faith requirement ....
Business expressed its desires positively by positing the goal of
freedom of contract. Any proposed regulatory legislation was judged by
whether or not it restricted business's freedom to operate. 150
The lack of enthusiasm among businesses may be due to the knowledge that
claims of bad faith are not always brought by the just against the unjust. 151
Nevertheless, Llewellyn fought for and ultimately got his "good faith"
standard. "Every contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance and enforcement."'152 Merchants were now
required to act not only honestly, but in accord with "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."'1 5 3 This obligation, moreover, is
mandatory. It cannot be waived even by the voluntary agreement of
sophisticated parties bargaining at arms'-length. 154 Such parties will, it is
true, have some flexibility to adjust the duties of good faith, but only if their
agreement is not "manifestly unreasonable."'1 5 5 Thus Mr. Broeker of
Bethlehem Steel might be able to agree to an "unreasonable" contract, but not
a "manifestly unreasonable" one. Article 2 provides little guidance on the
difference between the two.
3. The Realism of Good Faith
Given the lack of evidence that any provision like this was needed to
protect merchants, and the opposition of the merchants themselves, this
provision plainly has to be based on something else. What is that basis?
Perhaps there was some feeling that a commercial system with an
enforceable good faith obligation would be more economically efficient and
150 Kamp, supra note 17, at 374 (footnotes omitted).
151 The amorphous and fact-bound nature of the "good faith" inquiry makes it
difficult to dispose of on summary judgment, which makes it a perfect tool for those who
want to raise non-meritorious claims and defenses.
152 U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004).
153 Id. § 2-103(l)(b) (2002).





better for merchants in general than one without. But given the strong
opposition of merchants themselves, we would need some actual evidence to
override their own views, and we have none.
Some kind of good-faith obligation to consumers by merchants would
make sense as a consumer-protection provision. But that is not what this is.
This applies-and was obviously intended specifically to apply-to arm's
length transactions between merchants.
We might try to justify it on the ground that there is a general, legally
enforceable norm that people must act in good faith toward each other, but
there obviously is not. Even if we narrow it to a claim that people ought to
act in good faith in business transactions, there is again no such norm. Non-
merchants (like you, me, and Llewellyn himself) have no similar obligations,
even when dealing with consumers. We need only show "honesty in fact," an
obligation already covered by the fraud rules. The lack of this particular
social norm is nicely illustrated by the fate of Revised Article 1, which
sought to impose the good faith requirement on non-merchants through its
new section 1-302. The storm over imposing such an amorphous and
potentially hazardous obligation on ordinary voting human beings was
impressive; and several states that have enacted Revised Article 1 have
refused to apply the good faith standard to non-merchants.1 56
One possible explanation is that Llewellyn regarded this "good faith"
obligation as already part of the law, although applied sub rosa.157 But even
in the unlikely event that Llewellyn's view was accurate (and it is clear that
his merchant critics did not agree) we would still need a singing reason for
the rule. Llewellyn would have been the last person to conclude that a rule
was desirable because it was already a rule.
So we have to have some explanation as to why Bethlehem Steel must,
under penalty of legal compulsion, act in good faith when it deals with
General Motors, but I do not have a similar obligation to act in good faith
when I sell my car to my neighbor or decide how to educate my children. 158
The reason for the rule does not merely fail to sing out clearly-it is keeping
its mouth tightly shut.
156 See Posting of Keith Rowley to ContractsProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog (July 7, 2006).
157 Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1915, 1935 (2005).
158 There certainly are legal obligations that I must satisfy with respect to my
children. But there is a considerable difference between those obligations and a general
duty to act in good faith toward them. Similarly, there are explicit legal obligations that
apply to the way Bethlehem Steel conducts many aspects of its business. The question is
why an additional over-arching "good faith" requirement-independent of any specific
obligations-applies to Bethlehem but not me.
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D. Trade Usage, etc.
A fourth major innovation in the Code is its explicit emphasis on looking
at the specific commercial setting of a given transaction. Under the Code,
evidence of "course of performance" (how the parties have behaved in
performing the contract at issue), "course of dealing" (how the parties
performed on prior contracts between them), and "trade usage" (how other
parties perform on similar contracts) play a different and more important role
than they did under the common law. For convenience, I will generally refer
to this as "usage" evidence.
1. Common Law
At common law, usage evidence was regularly introduced to prove or
explain the terms of a contract. All contracts, after all, are struck against a
background not only of the local legal system, but of the parties' past
relationship and the ways in which business is conducted in the locality.
Common law courts were, and are, generally favorable to such evidence:
When there is such an established usage, it becomes the law of the
trade, and applies to the dealings of the parties, controlling them in the same
manner as the statute or common law in ordinary cases. It must, however,
have been continued for such length of time as to have become generally
known to those engaged in the trade and so general as to have become the
settled rule of commercial intercourse, in the absence of any special
agreement or particular course of dealing between individuals which form
exceptions to the general rule prescribed by usage. The usage and custom of
any particular trade is the law by which it is to be regulated. 159
Thus, for example, local custom supplied the rule whether grain could be
shipped on deck or had to be stowed in the hold under a bill of lading that
was silent on the subject;' 60 the meaning of policy provisions in a maritime
insurance policy might depend on the usages of a particular ship's port; 16 1
and the customs of local carriers were admissible to decide whether a
shipboard fire was a "danger of the river" that allowed a carrier to escape
liability. 162
159 York v. Wistar, 30 F. Cas. 821, 822 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 18,141).
160 See Chubb v. Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Bushels of Oats, 5 F. Cas. 663
(S.D.N.Y. 1864) (No. 2709).
161 See Hazard's Adm'r v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 557, 580-
81(1834).
162 See Sampson & Lindsay v. Gazzam, 6 Port. 123, 133 (Ala. 1837).
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At common law, such evidence was much more restricted when the
parties had reduced their agreement to writing. Under this "parol evidence
rule," courts believed that where the parties had taken the time and effort to
express themselves in writing, the writing was the best evidence of what they
actually intended. Other forms of evidence would thus be barred to
supplement or contradict an integrated written contract. Parol evidence of
such things as trade usage might still be relevant, but on much narrower
issues, such as the meaning of a particular term. Where the parties had
expressed themselves in writing, trade usage was no longer the "law" by
which the parties' deal would be regulated, but merely an aid to construction
of the written agreement. Here is Justice Story's take on the issue:
[Usage evidence] may also be admitted to ascertain the true meaning of
a particular word, or of particular words in a given instrument, when the
word or words have various senses, some common, some qualified, and
some technical, according to the subject-matter, to which they are applied.
But I apprehend, that it can never be proper to resort to any usage or custom
to control or vary the positive stipulations in a written contract, and, a
fortiori, not in order to contradict them. An express contract of the parties is
always admissible to supersede, or vary, or control, a usage or custom; for
the latter may always be waived at the will of the parties. But a written and
express contract cannot be controlled, or varied, or contradicted by a usage
or custom; for that would ... allow mere presumptions and implications,
properly arising in the absence of any positive expressions of intention, to
control, vary, or contradict the most formal and deliberate written
declarations of the parties. 163
Thus, this evidence under the pre-Code law functioned as a kind of
backstop when a written contract was at issue, filling obvious gaps and
interpreting particular terms. This was its role under the Uniform Sales Act,
which permitted "course of dealing" or "custom" to vary the ordinary legal
rules that would apply to the contract, but not to vary the express language of
the agreement. 164
This still left a good deal of room for such evidence, though. In the 1937
case of Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co.,165 for example, a contract term allowed a
buyer of horse meat scrap a discount of $5 per ton for any scrap that
"analyzes less than 50% of protein."'166 The buyer claimed the discount for
163 The Reeside, 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657) (involving
delivery of oil by ship under a bill of lading).
164 U.S.A., supra note 65, § 71.
165 16 P.2d 627 (Or. 1937).
166 Id. at 628.
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scrap that analyzed between 49.53 and 49.96 percent. 167 The seller
successfully argued to the court that a local trade usage specified that when
horse meat dealers wrote "50 percent," they actually meant "49.5 percent."'1 68
2. Usage in the U. C.C.
Llewellyn and the other drafters rejected this relatively modest use of
usage evidence as an adjunct to contract interpretation. Instead, they
preferred a system that gave it much more importance, allowing it even to
trump the plain language of the parties' agreement. Under the U.C.C., usage
evidence is always admissible to supplement or vary the terms of a contract,
no matter how detailed and explicit those terms are, and even if the written
agreement disclaims such evidence. 169 The very definition of "contract," as
noted above, includes not only the "agreement" of the parties but also the
"course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."' 170 These
"must be given due consideration" in defining the obligations of the
parties. 171 A merchant's description of goods must always be read against
"the applicable trade usages."'172 An explicit promise may be varied by a
showing of "commercial leeways in performance" derived from usage of
trade. 173 Usage of trade may vary the Code's own default rules that would
otherwise be applicable. 174 It may give rise to implied terms, such as
warranties, 175 or exclude terms that would otherwise be implied. 176 It may
restrict the rights of a seller to protect itself in the event of breach. 177 In
short, under Article 2, courts must always take usage evidence into account.
The classic illustration of the role this evidence plays under Article 2 is
the Ninth Circuit's well-known decision in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.
Shell Oil Co.178 In the case, the plaintiff had a long-term supply contract
under which it agreed to buy its asphalt from Shell at Shell's regular "posted
167 Id.
168 Id. at 629.
169 See U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (2002).
170 Id. § 1-201(3).
171 Id. § 2-301 cmt.
172 Id. § 2-313 cmt. 5.
173 Id. § 2-106 cmt. 2.
174 See, e.g., id. § 2-308 cmt. 4 (treating trade usage as "agreement" of the parties to
vary the default terms).
175 See U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (2002).
176 See id. § 2-316(3)(c).
177 See id. § 2-706 cmt. 4 (explaining that U.C.C. section 2-703(2) enables the seller
to use the remedy of resale "in accordance with reasonable commercial practices").
178 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
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price." 179 When Shell's posted price went up substantially in 1974-likely
due to the crisis arising from the OPEC oil embargo-the plaintiff sued,
claiming that a usage of trade among "material suppliers to the asphaltic
paving trade in Hawaii" 180 required Shell to provide "price protection" to it,
and thus in effect to sell it the asphalt at a price substantially less than the
posted price at which it sold to everyone else. The court agreed, holding that
evidence of what Nanakuli's other suppliers had done and of two prior
occasions on which Shell had delayed a price increase amounted to usage of
trade and course of dealing that added this particular term to the contract.1 81
Interestingly, had Nanakuli not had an existing contract with Shell (which
specifically required payment of the posted price) it would presumably have
had to pay (like everyone else) Shell's posted price if Nanakuli wanted any
asphalt. 182 On reading the case it is difficult to imagine any way that Shell
could have insisted on its posted price, because evidence that other sellers of
supplies to Nanakuli gave such discounts would have been admissible no
matter how ironclad its language and how strict its prior insistence.
3. The Realism of Usage
What exactly is the justification for a decision like this? 183 Llewellyn
would likely point out that there are plenty of situations in which people who
enter into contracts use words in unconventional ways. The classic example
is the trade usage that says a "two by four" piece of lumber will actually
measure 3.5 x 1.5 inches.184 There are other situations where this may be the
case-a "pound" of caviar means 14 ounces, say, or an "ounce" of platinum
means a "troy ounce," not an avoirdupois ounce. 185
But the question is not whether people sometimes use terms in their
agreements in a way different from their normal use. The question is rather
179 Id. at 778.
180 Id. Shell argued that asphalt was different than the other supplies used by paving
companies, like crushed rock (presumably because petroleum prices fluctuate much more
than do prices for rock), and thus that the relevant trade should be asphalt producers, not
paving suppliers. The court disagreed.
181 Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 793.
182 The "posted price" is the price at which the seller is generally willing to sell to
all takers.
183 Other than the fact that Nanakuli was a local outfit playing on its home turf, and
no one likes giant international oil companies.
184 See Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom?
Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 775, 787
(2000).
185 See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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whether courts should give effect to such different meanings offered by only
one of the parties after the fact when the term in the contract has an otherwise
plain meaning. For Llewellyn and most modem commercial law scholars, the
answer is obvious: yes. We are, after all, trying to carry out the parties'
agreement, aren't we? The more evidence we have, the more likely we are to
discover the truth. But from a Realist perspective, the question is not that
simple.
First, there are considerable costs involved. If we rely on the plain
language of the agreement, we run the risk that the result will not be what the
parties intended. But if we pick some other meaning or some other term
based on the evidence of one of the parties, we run precisely the same risk.
The parties in Nanakuli might have intended to include price protection as a
term of the agreement, or they might not. A decision whether it makes sense
to allow usage to trump explicit language means that we have to be confident
not only that the judge and jury will be right more often than not, but that
they will be right significantly more often than not, given the increased costs
of litigating that come from trying to prove such things. Llewellyn had no
evidence that this is the case, nor do we.
Second, the ability of parties to contradict plain language itself imposes
costs on those who are outsiders to the contract. Take the Hurst case, for
example. 186 It would have been easy for the contracting parties in Hurst to
have written "49.5 percent" instead of "50 percent" if that had, in fact, been
their understanding. Suppose that there really was such an existing usage, but
the case had gone the other way. In this one case, one of the parties would
have been treated unfairly. But what would happen next? Presumably all the
horse meat scrap dealers in this locality would change their correspondence
or their forms to say "not less than 49.5 percent protein." There would be no
more disputes about whether 49.5 means 50, and if by chance one surfaced
(some dealer, say, did not get the news and changed its terms) its lawyers
would realize that going to litigation was a waste of time. By giving effect to
the claimed usage between these two parties, on the other hand, the court
ensured that this would remain a lively subject of future litigation. After all,
if a future claimant wants to come up with evidence that 50 percent really
means 45 percent, it will be free to do so. And a future party will be free to
argue that there really is no such usage, and that 50 percent means 50
percent. 187
186 Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627 (1937).
187 Another effect on third parties is shown by the decision in Nanakuli. Shell had
twice delayed price increases to the plaintiff, allowing it to buy at lower than the posted
price for brief periods. The court found that this practice was not simply a nice thing for
Shell to have done, but constituted a course of performance that justified imposing the
price protection term. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772,
793 (9th Cir. 1981). If Shell wants to avoid such liability in the future, it will have to stop
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Or take the Nanakuli case. Assume that there really was such an existing
usage that everyone understood, but that Shell nevertheless won. In that case,
asphalt users in Hawaii would merely have had to put the price protection
term into their contracts. If this really was a widespread and well-understood
practice, there should be little difficulty in fixing the forms.188
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, it is doubtful that commercial
customs and trade usages are anywhere near as widespread as the Code's
drafters believed. How often do business people knowingly enter contracts
containing terms that mean something different than what they appear to say
on their face? Certainly in consumer transactions, merchants spell out their
terms. If they expect twenty-four percent interest and payment by the tenth of
the month, they say so, and do not expect that they will have much luck later
in court arguing that "twelve percent" really means "twenty-four percent."
Are these same merchants less careful when entering into much larger and
potentially more costly agreements? How often do the lawyers paid by the
merchants knowingly draft terms whose meanings are different than those
that would be assigned by an ordinary judge or jury? Why aren't the lawyers
reducing litigation risk by using terms that are not open to future litigation?
There certainly are plenty of cases where, after the fact, one party claims that
some trade usage should be read as varying the terms of the deal that the
parties appear to have struck. But people who are trying to get out of a
contractual obligation have been known to dissemble.
In fact, we know very little about the prevalence of such trade practices.
The drafters engaged in no research. The best recent study suggests that the
kind of real, well-accepted trade usages that parties invariably rely on are
much less common than Llewellyn thought. 189 Lisa Bernstein looked at the
historical development of the hay, grain, textile, and silk industries-all of
them precisely the sorts of close-knit industries where trade custom would be
expected to develop-and found little evidence of the kind of industry-wide
norms that Llewellyn imagined. 190 Merchant associations began writing up
trade rules, definitions, and standard form contracts because there was often
no agreement as to the simplest matters. 191 When they tried to draft those
giving such breaks to its customers.
188 Shell, of course, would probably refuse to put the term into its agreement, and
the asphalt users would probably lack the bargaining power to insist. But that raises the
question of why a party that could not have gotten its term as part of the written
agreement ought to be able to get it through the back door as trade usage--other than the
fact that we don't like giant international oil companies, of course.
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rules, they ran into problems because there was, in fact, no general agreement
as to which practices were best. 192
In sum, we do not know how widespread such practices are, we do not
know whether the results we get are more accurate when we allow such
evidence than when we do not, and we are imposing significant costs on
business.
V. "REALISM ABOUT REALISM"1 93
None of these four major changes in commercial law can be justified as
noticeably Realist whether we are talking descriptively or normatively. They
were not derived from commercial practice, they were not desired by their
putative beneficiaries, and their purposes are obscure. Whatever reasons they
may have do not "sing out." On the contrary, they lie deep beneath the
cloudbank of Realist rhetoric. To determine the real reasons for these rules,
we have to dispel the clouds. Let's look at what each of these four changes
has in common, and at who benefits from each.
Contractformation. 194 By telling courts to find contracts where offer and
acceptance do not match in even purely executory deals, the Code's
formation rules ensure that many more transactions will be subject to legal
enforcement than was the case under the common law. By replacing the
arbitrary but relatively certain last-shot rule with the equally arbitrary but
much less certain first-shot rule, 195 they ensure that lawyers will be less able
to predict the outcome of litigation and hence will increase the number of
disputes likely to end up in court. Under section 2-207 it is widely
acknowledged that it is virtually impossible for sellers to ever ensure that
they get their own terms on a deal, which breeds more uncertainty and
litigation. Who gains from this? Not sellers or buyers-their liability will be
contingent on which form a judge chooses to consider the "offer" and which
192 Id
193 See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 9.
194 See supra Part IV.A.
195 Under the last-shot rule, it is generally easy to tell which form governs-the last
one sent before performance. It is more difficult in the first-shot situation, because the
analysis turns on which form we decide to consider the "offer." Take the situation in
which the buyer sends a request for a quote to seller, seller sends a quote form stating that
it will sell at a particular price, buyer sends a purchase order, and seller sends an order
acknowledgment. If the seller's first form is viewed as the offer, buyer's purchase order
is the acceptance, and seller's acknowledgment is redundant. Buyer will get seller's terms
because it accepted seller's original offer. If, on the other hand, we view seller's first
form as a mere price quote, or "offer to deal," then buyer's purchase order is the offer and
seller's acknowledgment is the acceptance, and seller gets buyer's terms. Because the
question of which form is offer and which is acceptance is a question of fact, the
litigation possibilities are endless.
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the "acceptance." The big winners are the state, which gains more control
over contracting parties, and lawyers, who get to enjoy more litigation.
Judges, who get to pick which form they consider to be the offer, get a big
boost in discretion to impose terms on parties.
Certainty.196 The relaxation of the certainty requirements and the Code's
freer use of default terms, have similar effects. Courts will more often supply
contract terms where the intent of the parties is doubtful. In situations where
the common law would have let the parties go their own ways, the Code
provides for enforceable legal obligations. Parties are much more likely to be
stuck with deals that they did not want to make, and the change greatly
increases the number of business transactions in which parties will be subject
to judicial control.
Good faith.197 The mandatory good faith standard is even broader,
creating new realms of potential liability for contracting parties who have
complied with the explicit letter of their agreements and potential
enforceable obligations to others even before a contract is reached. 198 This
means that it is impossible for business people to control the extent of their
liabilities in contractual matters. No agreement, however explicit, can
entirely eliminate the risk that a party will be found contractually liable for
damages even where it has done precisely what it promised.
Usage.199 Reliance on usage evidence also increases the number of
contract disputes that will go to litigation, and decreases the ability of parties
to define their obligations with certainty. Every term in an agreement, no
matter how plain it seemed to the drafters, is open to future litigation. This is
true even where the parties have defined the term in their agreement, since
usage evidence comes in as a matter of law in every agreement under Article
2.200 Moreover, courts have the power to rely on usage evidence to find
terms that impose additional obligations not spelled out in the agreement.
What is better, from the judge's point of view, is that the judge is always free
to reject the usage evidence if he or she prefers the term the parties wrote in
the agreement.
What do all these things have in common? Each of them decreases the
power of contracting parties to control the obligations to which they are
19 6 See supra Part IV.B.
197 See supra Part IV.C.
198 See, e.g., Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736 (2d
Cir. 1998).
199 See supra Part IV.D.
200 True, if the term is clearly defined in the dickered terms of an agreement, the
odds are that the judge or jury will decide that the parties deliberately overrode the prior
usage. But there is no guarantee that this will be the case. And if the term is included in
the boilerplate of a form agreement, even if signed by both parties, the likelihood
increases that the fact-finder will ignore it.
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subject, and each increases the power of the courts-and thus the state-vis-
6-vis the parties. Each makes it more likely that the state can impose on a
party an obligation it did not agree to. Each makes it less likely that a party
can, by careful planning and scrupulous attention to detail, avoid liability.
Each increases the power of judges. Each increases the need for business
counseling and the likelihood of litigation, and thus the fees that lawyers
make.
The point is not that any of these social and political choices are bad.
Perhaps we really do believe that judges could make better contracts for the
parties than the parties could make themselves, at least in some cases.
Perhaps we believe that free contracting should be replaced, or at least
heavily supplemented, by status-based norms enforced by judges. The point
is that aversion to laissez-faire contracting is a social and political view, and
one that his highly contested within this society. It is based not on the
"realities of the marketplace"--odds are that Mr. Broeker of Bethlehem Steel
had a much clearer view of commercial reality than any of the Realist
academics who worked on the Code 201-but on the Progressive politics of
the New Deal. Where they differed was not that Broeker and Bethlehem were
mesmerized by legal theory while the law professors were taking a hard look
at reality. No, they differed because Broeker and Bethelehem wanted
freedom to do business as they liked, while Llewellyn and his colleagues
wanted them to do business like Jimmy Stewart. They just disagreed:
The academic reformers... wanted a "business commonwealth," a
regulated system of commerce, in which a modem, efficient commercial
law based on good business practices and judicial oversight would replace
antiquated formal laws and unregulated private agreement. The commercial
world.., did want the efficiency of a modem statute, but did not want
regulation. It wanted autonomy and freedom from oversight by trade
groups, statutes, and judges.2 02
Llewellyn's first version of the Code was a much more explicitly
regulatory effort than the version later enacted. It contained many of the
limitations on free contract that would later come to be generally adopted by
statute or common law, including consumer protection provisions,
requirements for disclosure in loan agreements, and elimination of privity
requirements for breach of warranty. None of these had any particular Realist
underpinnings. People disagreed about whether such things were desirable
for an economy, but that disagreement had nothing to do with the fact that
they could not be deduced from Langdellian legal science. A rule that
benefits consumers at the expense of producers is no more or less Realistic
201 See supra text accompanying note 158.
202 Kamp, supra note 17, at 371.
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than one that benefits producers at the expense of consumers. The question is
merely which group you want to burden and which you want to benefit. Long
before the Realists, legislatures were routinely regulating commercial
transactions. Llewellyn just wanted to go further than they had in the same
direction. If Realist rhetoric was useful in getting to his collectivist vision,
Llewellyn the bricoleur would use it. If not, he would use something else.
Llewellyn's views were fairly mainstream ones among people of his
class in the 1930s. Under the Hoover Administration, led by the first
engineer to become President, the Commerce Department saw its mission as
helping to eliminate the "wasteful competition" of naked capitalism. 20 3 The
New Deal that followed was even more emphatic about "coordinating"
business under government control. Like many of his Realist colleagues,204
Llewellyn was a thoroughgoing New Dealer, sharing the New Deal faith that
supervision by smart and disinterested government experts could make a
capitalist economy run much more efficiently. Moreover, in the years leading
up to and following Llewellyn's initial draft of Article 2, he was writing
against the background of a general public belief that the Soviet economic
miracle proved that production worked much better-or at least as well-
when sordid, competitive capitalists were removed,20 5 followed by the
experience of government-controlled wartime production which similarly
managed to limit "wasteful competition." 20 6
Regulation of private business transactions among large firms was a
natural step for people who shared Llewellyn's views. The New Deal had
brought vast new areas of American life under government control and
supervision, and the results looked good. What reason would there be to treat
commercial contractual relationships differently than employment
203 OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS: REFORM AND WAR IN AMERICA,
1900-1928, at 134 (1971).
204 Many of the prominent Realists held important positions in the FDR
Administration, among them Jerome Frank, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and
Thurman Arnold. TWINING, supra note 7, at 58.
205 Soviet workers were said to labor only seven hours a day, were paid for all
holidays, got the best social welfare system in world history, faced no unemployment,
and enjoyed rapidly rising wages that put them not far below skilled workers in Britain
and the United States. See, e.g., JOHN STRACHEY, HOPE IN AMERICA 163-70 (1938).
2 0 6 See JEFFERY M. DORWART, EBERSTADT AND FORRESTAL: A NATIONAL SECURITY
PARTNERSHIP, 1909-1949, at 30-68 (1991). This, as noted previously, was Llewellyn's
view. But wartime production during World War II was, though very effective in
achieving victory, extraordinarily wasteful in the routine sense of consuming vastly more
resources, human and material, per unit of production than could possibly be tolerated in
a civilian firm. See ROBERT A. LEVINE, PUBLIC PLANNING: FAILURE AND REDIRECTION
104-31 (1972).
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relationships, 20 7 sales of securities, 20 8 bank deposits, 20 9 utility services,2 10
and all the other areas brought under government supervision by expert
agencies? Contractual relationships can, after all, be at least as dangerous as
a good many criminal activities. The amount of money that can be lost in a
business deal dwarfs the amount that any given employee, even a CEO, can
embezzle. 211
By the 1950s, though, collectivist social legislation had gone out of
fashion with the heating up of the Cold War. Anything that smacked of
socialism-as some critics suggested that Llewellyn's Code did212-was on
the defensive. Business plainly recognized Llewellyn's game and wanted
little part of it. "One of the recurring criticisms of the Code," writes Allen
Kamp, "was that it was 'reform,' 'paternalist,' 'leftist,' or 'social'
legislation," which to American merchants were "not good things. '213
Thus, the explicitly regulatory portions of Llewellyn's Article 2 had to be
scrapped to get it past the practicing lawyers and their clients who dominated
the ALI.2 14 Those innovations that finally worked their way through the
uniform law process were justified not on grounds that they limited the
ability of firms to do business as they chose, but that they were actually
helping them to do so. Grant Gilmore stopped talking openly about replacing
the laissez-faire system, at least until after the Code became widely
adopted.215 The Realist myth of the Code was born in the battles with the
ALI and in the struggle for adoption.
207 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
208 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
209 See Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
210 See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z-6
(2000) (repealed 2005).
211 An obvious case in point is the litigation surrounding Westinghouse's disastrous
long-term uranium supply contracts during the 1970s. See In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981). The economics of the
case are discussed in Donald Vandegrift, Decision Costs, Contract Excuse, and the
Westinghouse Commercial Impracticability Case, 4 EuR. J.L. & ECON. 41 (1997); Paul L.
Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977).
212 Some business critics viewed the proposed Code as "communist-inspired."
Kamp, supra note 12, at 383.
213 See Kamp, supra note 17, at 395.
214 The travails of Llewellyn's statute are traced in Allen Kamp's two articles on the
history of the Code. See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REv. 275 (1998); Kamp, supra note 17.
215 He would make his case for replacing laissez-faire contract with tort law a few




We no longer have to fight those particular battles. Consumer protection
legislation, disclosure laws, the vast expansion of tort liability, have remade
commercial law in ways at least as far-reaching as Llewellyn's original
Code. The laissez-faire ideal, while still defended in some quarters, has
largely gone by the board as a practical matter. There is no more
constitutional right to contract, and the public is perfectly willing to tolerate
extensive controls over how people do business with each other. Llewellyn
may have needed to camouflage his reform agenda with a cloud of Realist
rhetoric. We do not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Commercial law is a complex field. This is because the market economy
it tries to promote and regulate is itself impossibly complex, and because
people disagree strenuously on fundamental economic and social issues. The
task of writing good commercial legislation and making good decisions in
commercial cases is difficult enough even when we fully comprehend our
current situation and have clear a purpose in mind for the decisions we make.
It is much harder-perhaps impossible-if we allow ourselves to be blinded
by clouds of rhetoric.
So let's stop talking about the "bargain in fact" of the parties. Let's get
rid of the fictional "commercial understanding" and admit that when we
impose an obligation on an unwilling party, we are doing so in spite of that
party's wishes, not in furtherance of them. Let's stop talking about the
Realist origins of Article 2.
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